You can help by adding to it. November s[ edit ] After the establishment of the People's Republic of China PRC inrelations with Japan changed from hostility and an absence of contact to cordiality and extremely close cooperation in many fields. Japan was defeated and Japanese military power dismantled but the PRC continued to view Japan as a potential threat because of the presence of United States Forces Japan in the region. On the other hand, some Japanese fear that the economic and military power of the PRC has been increasing cf.
Where is there the greatest potential for the most destructive conflict? Would it be from North Korea, with its burgeoning and almost incessant nuclearization program, perhaps, or the ongoing tensions between Pakistan and India?
Or the real possibility of instability and fragmentation in, for instance, a young democracy like Indonesia, with its internal complexity and lack of institutional strength?
All of these are worrying problems. If they do achieve this, they will be going against the pattern of their whole history with each other.
Click here to subscribe for full access. And what a terrifying history this has been. Japanese and Chinese imperial disdain for each other manifested itself very early on in prickly protocol, with the Chinese dynastic courts always trying to present Japan as a semi-vassal state, and the Japanese returning the contempt in the earliest dynasties.
The documents Dreyer uses in her overview of the first thousand years of this history give ample testimony to this phenomenon. Its victory in war not just with Qing China inbut against the Russians inwere preludes to a rampant nationalism that engulfed the whole region during World War II.
A long term view of this history shows a clear pattern: There were warm moments in the s and into the s, with the odd, short sunny period in the s and mids. But the recent dip in relations has been a long one, continuing for almost a decade.
Such dips and peaks are connected by an internal logic — they are evidence of strategic competition between the two. But the recent downturn occurs in a context in which, for the first time ever, both are modernized, globally significant economies. The risks arising from their inability to create long term, balanced, sustainable relations with each other have therefore escalated.
We know one of the main sources of this recent ill feeling on the Chinese side — the continuing anger over what is seen as Japanese unwillingness to confront their history of aggression in World War II.
For Japan, where the vast majority of its people were born long after the tragic events of eight decades ago, however, this persistence by China for greater, continuing penance has clearly started to grate.
Japanese irritation toward the Chinese is more recent, and stems from the ways in which former prime ministers from the early s onward into the s made a clear strategic decision to engage and work with China in its modernization process but received a poor return for it.
Dreyer quotes one staggering statistic in her book that illustrates this — 70 percent of Japanese aid went to China in the s.
Chinese reform and opening up would not have succeeded as quickly, and as extensively, without this assistance. In Japan, the consensus has been growing that the whole gamble of engagement with China is starting to look like it was a mistake.
Their neighbor has not changed politically, nor has it developed grateful or friendly feelings toward Japan. The ancient Greek historian Thucydides showed long ago that the price for peace is perpetual preparation for war.
Complacency about China and Japan being able to just muddle along and never clash with each other again would run against the long history where these clashes and fights happened all too often — with disastrous results for the region, and the two countries themselves.
Such reassurances are impossible to give. Creating a sustainable framework in which, at the very least, they can both manage their problems toward each other without resorting to fighting is the single greatest challenge, and the source of the most worrying instability, in Asia today.War between China and Japan looms, with neither power willing to back down over a disputed chain of islands, expert warns.
The most likely way war could break out between the two powers is through an escalating crisis. China and Japan both station Coast Guard ships in and around the Senkaku Islands. The deployment of. Japan, China, the United States and the Road to Pearl Harbor, –41 Between and , escalating conflict between China and Japan influenced U.S.
relations with both nations, and ultimately contributed to pushing the United States toward full-scale war with Japan and Germany. The Most Dangerous Problem in Asia: China-Japan Relations. and frankly incompatible, visions for the region –is found in the relationship between China and Japan.
It is this relationship. While people often discuss historical problems in the bilateral relationship between China and Japan, they normally only see history as a background issue for the current tension and thus refrain. The Coming Conflict Between China and Japan Dec.
6, As the U.S.
nears the limits of its power, regional powers will be more unencumbered than ever before. GPF Weekly.